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The large jump in trading activity -downwards for the pit and upwards for the ECNsat the start of 2008 presents a valuable 'natural experiment' that allows us to examine the characteristics and determinants of afterhours trading under two different settings.
We contribute to the existing literature both in terms of economic content and econometric methodology. We postulate a feedback mechanism between trading activity on the one hand and price informativeness and trading costs on the other hand. Using a modelling framework capturing the intraday variation in price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact of trades, we examine the existence and evolution of this feedback mechanism over time. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) provide a theoretical framework for the clustering of trade activity with price informativeness for low degrees of information asymmetry: liquidity traders can cluster with informed traders as long as their adverse selection costs are outweighed by their benefits from informative prices generated by the competition between informed traders. Barclay and Hendershott (2004) present empirical evidence for a mutually reinforcing relationship between the low afterhours trading activity and the two factors related to trading costs, namely adverse selection and price impact, which we also evaluate in this study.
In terms of econometric methodology, we provide a unified framework to estimate structural parameters as time-varying processes. We assume a latent price process, in which price changes originate either from the surprises in the flow of buyer-or seller-initiated trades, namely the order flow, or from price innovations unrelated to the trading process.
The surprises encompass the pricing of private information signals, measuring the information asymmetry (Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans, 1997). As we control for the price changes generated through the private information signals with the surprise term, the innovation process captures the pricing of public information. The latent price is observed with noise. We distinguish the price impact of trades from the rest of noise sources. We model the innovation and noise variances as well as the information asymmetry and the price impact of trades as time-varying processes. This framework improves upon estimation methods for different aspects of afterhours trading by various reduced-form methods and accounts for the time-variation in the structural parameters.
We test two hypotheses to explain the activity clustering around the pit hours. We firstly examine the effect of price discovery in the trading pit. If pit trades are considerably informative, market participants may prefer to trade during the pit hours at more informative prices. We find that for the early years of our sample the trading pit has a considerable share in price discovery. In 2004 pit trades account for 32.0% of the variation in permanent price innovations. With the introduction of the Globex Platform in 2008, this figures drops to 11.5% and pit activity declines so rapidly that proper inference is not possible for later years.
As this fast decline of the pit does not affect the activity clustering around the pit hours, we reject informativeness of pit trading as a significant factor for the persistence of this clustering.
Secondly, we look into the dynamics of the afterhours to discern the factors preventing the diffusion of trading activity from the pit hours, thereby sustaining the activity clustering.
In particular, we test the hypothesis of a feedback mechanism between trading activity, price informativeness and trading costs during the afterhours. This temporal focus is based on the consideration that the diffusion of trading activity towards the afterhours is prevented by the dynamics of afterhours trading. Therefore investigating the afterhours will provide insights on whether and to what degree the aforementioned factors prevent or support the low trading activity during the afterhours and thus the activity clustering around pit hours.
We find that percentage changes in price informativeness have about a positive one-to-one relationship with the changes in trading activity. By contrast, the changes in information asymmetry and price impact have a negative relationship with afterhours trading activity.
We observe a strengthening in the negative effect of information asymmetry during the crisis years. The reduction in trading activity for each one percent increase in information asymmetry moves from a pre-crisis average of -2.6% to an average of -20.8% from the second half of 2008 to 2010 and drops to -1.2% afterwards. In contrast to the persistent effect of information asymmetry, price impact loses its significant effect from the second half of 2007 on.
Several studies estimate structural models for the afterhours trading processes. Barclay and Hendershott (2004) investigate the activity clustering during the afterhours by decomposing the effective spread into adverse selection and fixed components with the Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) model and find the trading costs generated by low trading activity during the afterhours as a major factor for the persistence of pit hours trading. He, Lin, Wang, and
Wu (2009) Van der Wel, and Van Dijk (2014) . In contrast to these models using intraday data, Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) investigate price pressures with a state space model using daily data, thereby avoiding modelling issues like adverse selection based on short-term information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methods we use and formalizes our hypotheses. Section 3 shows descriptive statistics of our 30-year U.S.
Treasury futures data set. Section 4 investigates the determinants of the activity clustering around the pit hours by measuring pit informativeness and the dynamics of the afterhours.
Section 5 concludes.
Hypotheses and Methodology
In this section we firstly present our hypotheses. In the second subsection, we outline the information share methodology that we use. Lastly we present a way to estimate a structural model using state space methods.
Hypotheses
We have two hypotheses regarding the activity clustering around the pit hours. The first hypothesis looks at the pit hours to explain the attraction of trading activity to this time interval and poses the informativeness of pit trading as a cause for the preference of trading during the pit hours. The second hypothesis relates to the feedback loop between trading activity and variables related to informational and transaction costs and price informativeness as a source of the clustering.
Hypothesis 1: The trading pit constitutes an important venue for price discovery. Trading activity clusters around the pit hours, because traders benefit from more informed prices emerging from the trading pit.
The relative informativeness of the prices in the trading pit can pose a straightforward reason why the pit hours still attract the bulk of trade volume. A large literature shows that pit traders manage to avoid adverse selection problems through longstanding relationships and reputation and attract mainly uninformed and liquidity-oriented traders (Seppi, 1990; Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm, 1992; Madhavan and Cheng, 1997; Battalio, Ellul, and Jennings, 2007) . Contrasting with this largely uninformative order flow into the trading pit, the executions of pit traders seem to propagate price discovery. Sofianos and Werner (2000) note that the floor brokers act like "a smart order book" cutting the order into pieces and executing it strategically over an extended period of time. They condition their trades on the limit order book as well as the hidden liquidity arriving directly to the trading pit and benefit from order imbalances (Grossman, 1992; Madhavan and Smidt, 1993; Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz, 2006) . This quality infuses the pit order flow with a high predictive power on the asset's future price (Hasbrouck and Sofianos, 1993; Madhavan and Sofianos, 1998; Kavajecz, 1999; Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari, 2006) .
We analyse the contribution of the trading pit to price discovery using the information share methodology of De Jong and Schotman (2010) . This method relies on a structural model related to our model for afterhours trading. The hypothesis implies a considerable amount of price discovery in the trading pit and a positive relationship between the trading activity during the pit hours and the information share of the trading pit.
Hypothesis 2: Trading activity has a positive relationship with price informativeness and negative ones with trading costs related to information asymmetry and price impact. The activity clustering persists due to the benefits of trading at already-liquid times of the day, namely more informed prices and less adverse selection and price impact costs.
A mutually-reinforcing relationship between trading activity and other microstructure factors during the afterhours may result in a persistent trading activity difference between parts of the day. The model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) implies that the clustering of liquidity and informed traders may be sustained by benefitting both parties: While the informed traders enjoy the reduced impact of their trades, the liquidity traders benefit from the competition between trades with similar information. Information shared by market participants, like public news announcements, would not require trading to be priced, while information shared by fewer traders would be priced through the order flow. Following the theoretical results of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , we hypothesize that trading activity has a positive relationship with the magnitude of price informativeness and a negative one with the degree of information asymmetry. Also in line with Barclay and Hendershott (2004) , we expect a negative relationship between trading activity and price impact of trades.
Transaction costs generated by price impact of trades would drive away trading activity and would be further increased due to reduced trading activity.
We test the second hypothesis using time-varying estimates of the relevant variables measuring price informativeness and trading costs. We construct 20 half-yearly series for the afterhours. For each half-year, the regression of trade volume on the measures of the price informativeness, the information asymmetry and the price impact gives the effects of these three variables on trading activity. Our hypotheses imply the regression coefficient to be positive for the price informativeness and negative for the other two variables. A crosssectional regression for each 5-minute period during the afterhours across years constitutes another test for the significance of these relationships across the afterhours. We test this mechanism for the afterhours, because we want to examine the factors sustaining the low afterhours trading activity.
Information Shares
The first hypothesis requires the measurement of informativeness of trading in the pit compared to the ECN. We accomplish this using the information share methodology of De Jong and Schotman (2010) . In this framework, the observed prices of an asset in different venues, in this case in the trading pit and the ECN, are driven by a latent efficient price process. This latent price is modeled as a random walk with stationary innovations t . The These relations can be represented as
where p i,t is the log observed price, p * t is the latent efficient price, t is the innovation in the latent price with mean zero and variance σ 2 , the coefficients α i capture over/underreaction to the innovations t , e i,t are the zero-mean noise disturbances with covariance matrix Ω and are uncorrelated with the innovations in the latent price as well as other noise e j,t , i = j, and the coefficients ψ i capture serial correlation in the noise. This would simplify to the Roll (1984) model under no over/underreaction in prices to information (α i = 0), the exclusion of the lagged noise terms (ψ i = 0) and the replacement of the noise terms e t with the effective spread.
De Jong and Schotman (2010) propose a price discovery measure quantifying the ex-planatory power of changes in each of the observed security prices for the innovations in the latent price. The total price innovation of each venue in period t is defined as
To measure informativeness of the venues, we may then consider the regression of the innovation in the latent price on the total innovations in individual prices, that is
where η t is the innovation in the latent price unrelated to innovations in market prices.
De Jong and Schotman (2010) decompose the goodness-of-fit of this regression into information shares which show how much of the price innovations is explained by the total innovations in each market. Ozturk, Van der Wel and Van Dijk (2014) show that the information shares are defined as
and their sum gives the goodness-of-fit of the regression, which does not necessarily equal to one. The model parameters required for the computation of these information shares are estimated using GMM.
Structural Model with Intraday Variation
In order to estimate the variables related to the second hypothesis, we use a richer market microstructure model to evaluate afterhours trading. In the latent price process, we differentiate price innovations incorporated with and without trading. Changes in the beliefs of market participants about asset prices can emerge either from public news or through the signals in the order flow q i,t indicating information asymmetry. We express this difference in the structural model by including the surprise in the order flow as a determinant of the changes in the latent price, constraining innovations t to changes based on commonly shared information which does not require trading to be priced. Thus the latent price process is defined as
where p * t is the latent efficient price, (q t − E[q t |q t−1 ]) is the surprise in the order flow, θ t is the unexpected order flow coefficient and t is the public information component of the price innovation with mean zero and time-varying variance σ 2 t .
As we estimate this model in the afterhours, the observed price process consists of only the ECN data and the model undergoes three major modifications. The main change is the introduction of a measure of price impact of trades. In particular, we replace α i , the under/over-reaction coefficient of observed prices to latent price innovations, with the price impact coefficient δ. This new variable captures the reaction of observed prices to the whole order flow rather than just its informative component. Following prior empirical studies, we model the effect of trade volume as a concave function rather than a linear one (e.g., Kempf
and Korn (1999)). As a minor modification, we allow for more lags of noise to capture the serial correlation in the data created by transitory noise. Thus observed prices follow the
where J is the number of noise lags, e t are noise terms with mean zero and time-varying variance ω 2 t and δ t is price impact coefficient. Lastly the order flow is modelled as an autoregressive function
where R is set to six using information criteria results.
We estimate equations (5) and (6) by Maximum Likelihood using Kalman filtering. 2 This estimation method also allows for incorporating more complex dynamics into the model.
We model the variance of public price innovation σ 2 t , the noise variance ω 2 t as well as the coefficients of unexpected order flow θ t and of the price impact δ t as time-varying processes.
As in Ozturk et al. (2014), we implement time-variation using a combination of flexible
Fourier trigonometric functions and a polynomial function. The time-varying parameters have the form
where t denotes time with t = 1, . . . , T , T being the number of all observations, N is the number of observations per day, P the order of the polynomial part, and Q the total number of flexible Fourier sets. We use the exponent of this specification for the variances to facilitate an unconstrained maximization procedure given that trigonometric functions can have negative values. The flexible Fourier form can model complex dynamics and smooth transitions. However using solely the flexible Fourier part would impose equality of the variances at the start and end of the day. We avoid this by complementing it with the polynomial component.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we firstly introduce some summary statistics of our data set and then provide evidence for the activity clustering around the pit hours.
Data
We employ a data set of intraday transaction prices and [insert Table 1 and Figure 2 here]
Activity clustering
In contrast to the severe decline in the number of pit trades, especially after 2007, Figure   3 shows that the pit hours consistently attract a plurality of the ECN trade volume over the Building on the premise that the introduction of the Globex platform in January 2008 seals the fate of pit trading, as shown in Figure 2 , we split the sample period into pre- Globex (2004 Globex ( -2007 and Globex (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . Figure 4 contrasts the intraday distribution of ECN trade volume and trade size for these two periods. Although the clustering of the trade volume during the pit hours is virtually the same in the two periods, the average trade size is more than halved during the Globex period and gets more even across the day.
The reduction in average trade size signals the introduction of aforementioned algorithmic trading facilities to execute big orders with a series of small trades. The small increases at both 2:00h EST and 3:00h EST relate to the changing hours of the London market open for a few days in each year due to daylight saving time differences.
[insert Figure 4 here] Lastly, we use modified versions of two frequently-used measures of liquidity and price discovery to compare the pre-Globex and Globex periods. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (AIL) and weighted price contributions (WPC) are adapted to measure illiquidity and price discovery in 10-minute intervals across the day. They are defined as
where ∆p n,t = p n,t − p n,t−1 , p n,t is the price at intraday time t of day n with t = 1, ..., T and n = 1, ..., N , ∆p n = p n − p n−1 , p n is the price at the pit close (15:00h EST) of day n and V ol n,t is the ECN trade volume for the intraday interval from time t − 1 to t at day n. Figure 4 , the Amihud illiquidity drops for the afterhours, but remains far larger than the pit hours illiquidity. The average illiquidity of the pit hours measured by the average price change generated by the same amount of dollar-volume increases by 61.5% from pre-Globex to Globex years, mainly due to a surge at the start of the financial crisis. However the pit hours remain 5.7 times more liquid than the London and preopen hours (a drop from 18.2 times in the pre-Globex years), 1.9 times more liquid than the postclose hours (a decline from 3.7 times) and 27.5 times more liquid than the Tokyo hours (a drop from 96.2 times).
[insert Figure 5 here]
The WPC statistics in Figure 5 indicate a small trend towards the dispersion of price discovery to the afterhours in line with the changes in trading activity. The total contributions of the pit hours decrease from the 77.0% share of the pre-Globex years to 67.4% for the Globex years. The total contributions at the London and preopen hours increase from 12.5% to 18.3% and that of the Tokyo hours from 5.0% to 10.0%. Unlike other afterhours periods, the share of postclose hours in price discovery experiences a drop from 5.5% to 3.5%. We also note a slight shift of informativeness from day open to day close parallel to the shift in trade volumes in Figure 4 .
All in all, we document that a large portion of trades happen during pit hours, while there is only a modest trend towards the dispersion of the trading activity to the afterhours. The introduction of the Globex platform certainly improved the conditions of the afterhours for trading. However this improvement mostly remains an amelioration over the past conditions of the afterhours rather than catching up with the advantages of the pit hours. In particular, relative to the pre-Globex period the same total dollar-volume generates significantly less price change during the afterhours, but this price change remains still at least double of that generated during the pit hours. Afterhours prices become mildly more informative as the share of the daily price change generated by the afterhours increases from a quarter to a third. Only in the average trade sizes we find an equalization across different times of the day, which reduces the ability to trade with relatively bigger sizes in the pit hours without signalling one's trading objectives.
Why does the trading activity cluster around the pit hours?
In this section we test the two hypotheses outlined in section 2.1. We firstly check the informativeness of the pit trading over time, as trading with more informative prices may be a reason for the ECN participants to choose to trade during the pit hours. Secondly, we investigate how price informativeness and costs related to adverse selection and price impact affect trading activity during the afterhours. From 2009 on, the price staleness in the pit due to the pit hosting only 14 trades per day, as shown in Table 1 , impedes inferences on price discovery. The hypothesis of cointegration between the price series of the pit and the ECN is rejected for an increasing majority of days and the structural model is rejected by the Hansen's J-test.
Is pit trading informative?
[insert Table 2 here]
These results attest to the informativeness of pit trading compared to its share in the number of trades as well as its rapid demise with the sophistication in the electronic trading. 6 The validity of this structural model for the data can be tested using Hansen's J-test. Doing so, we do not reject the null hypothesis of model validity for the data from 2004 to 2008 at the 5% significance level.
7 In a simulation study, available upon request, we tested the effect of price staleness on the measurement of price discovery. This study implies that the increase of the price staleness in the pit data would decrease estimation accuracy, in particular by underestimating the pit information share. Thus the sizable information share of the trading pit even after the reduction in pit trades starting with 2008 is probably not an overestimate.
The substantial reduction in pit activity and price discovery from 2008 on does not cause a similar shift in the activity clustering around the pit hours. As shown in Figure 3 , the modest trend towards the diffusion of the trading activity to the afterhours actually halts in 2008. The financial crisis may have acted as a strong counterforce by increasing the importance of macroeconomic news announcements during the pit hours. However when this possible effect subsides during the recovery of the later years and the trading pit is reduced to a symbolic venue with less than 10 trades per day during the last four years of our sample, we still do not observe a decline of the same order of magnitude for the activity clustering.
In summary, we reject the Hypothesis 1 stating that market participants' preference for trading during the pit hours due to the informativeness of pit trading can explain the activity clustering. The pit has a considerable share in price discovery compared to its share in trading activity at least in the first half of our sample. However the rapid shrinkage of pit activity after the implementation of the Globex ECN is not accompanied by a shift in the activity clustering.
What determines trading activity during the afterhours?
In this section we use the estimates from the structural model presented in section 2.3 to discern the dynamics of afterhours trading and to evaluate Hypothesis 2. Firstly we present the intraday estimates. Then we compare the estimates across four afterhours periods. Lastly we test whether the effects of price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact on trading activity conform with our second hypothesis and can provide an answer to our main research question. (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Foster and Viswanathan, 1990; Easley and O'Hara, 1992) .
[insert Figure 9 here] The price impact of trades constitutes a major obstacle for the proliferation of trading.
Therefore the sustainability of activity clustering during the pit hours relies on the resilience of the price impact during the afterhours. The mean price impact coefficients during afterhours periods, shown in Figure 10 [insert Figure 10 here] To test the second hypothesis, we take first differences of the natural logarithms of our variables and regress the afterhours trade volume on the proxies of price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact. As the regressors are estimates themselves, we use the Murphy and Topel (1985) method to calculate correct standard errors. Table 3 reports for each half-year the results of separate regressions for each variable and a regression using all three variables. Price informativeness emerges as the most significant factor explaining intraday changes in trading activity. It has a strong positive relationship with trading activity as postulated and its effect is significant at 5% level in 13 out of 20 regressions.
The coefficient displays little fluctuation across years and indicates that a percentage change in price informativeness relates to a percentage change of the same magnitude for trading activity.
[insert Table 3 here] The results for information asymmetry and price impact express a weaker relationship with trading activity. Out of the 20 regressions, the effect of information asymmetry is insignificant at 5% level for four separate regressions and 11 combined ones. Price impact has an insignificant effect for 11 regressions of both types. In the significant cases the We can test these relationships also cross-sectionally for each 5-minute interval of the afterhours. Figure 11 reports the coefficient estimates generated by regressing the changes in trade volume on the contemporaneous changes in the estimates of public innovation variance, unexpected order flow coefficient and price impact coefficient. Although we have a small number of observations per regression (19 at best), for 51, 50 and 61 out of the 184 5-minute intervals we find the regression coefficients to be significant at 5% level for the price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact regressions, respectively.
[insert Figure 11 here]
The signs of the statistically significant regression coefficients are in line with the time series regressions and the second hypothesis. In all cases we observe a less than one-to-one effect of percentage changes in the three variables on trading activity. Although the postclose period has the highest share of significant cases, the effects of information asymmetry and price impact are negligibly small for the year-to-year changes, mainly due to the large increases they experience during the crisis years.
In summary, we find nuanced but positive evidence for the second hypothesis. Price informativeness during the afterhours has a significant positive relationship with trading activity. The negative relation between information asymmetry and trading activity has risen particularly during the financial crisis. Price impact requires a more refined interpretation, because its negative relation with trading activity loses its significance from the second half of 2007 on.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the factors behind the concentration of trading around the pit hours. For the case of the U.S. Treasury futures, about three quarters of trades happen during this 400 minutes of a trading day. However, we document a mild secular trend towards the erosion of this clustering. We find the largest trade volume increases during the trade hours of the London market for U.S. Treasury futures and the largest drops in Amihud (2002) illiquidity during the Tokyo market hours. The recent financial crisis stops this trend at least for a while, probably because of the increasing importance of macroeconomic announcements made during the pit hours and a stronger preference for trading in more liquid times of the day.
We find the informativeness of pit trades to be an unsatisfactory explanation for the activity clustering. The trading pit indeed has a sizable share in price discovery before the introduction of the Globex Platform in 2008. However the substantial reduction of pit trading after 2008 does not cause a significant change in the mild erosion trend of the trading activity share of the pit hours. The last few years make this conclusion clearer as the dynamics generated by the financial crisis subside. We observe flatter patterns, but considerable differences across afterhours periods for the coefficients of the order flow and the unexpected order flow, measuring price impact and information asymmetry respectively. The preopen stands out as the most informative afterhours period, while the postclose has the least information asymmetry. Discounting for the effects of the financial crisis, we observe a progressive decrease during the afterhours for information asymmetry, price impact of trades and the amount of noise in prices, attributable to the improvements in electronic trading.
Our findings confirm price informativeness and costs related to information asymmetry and price impact as significant explanatory factors for activity clustering. Price informativeness during the afterhours has a stable and strong positive relationship with the distribution of trading activity. Information asymmetry generates adverse selection costs pushing liquidity traders away and its effect is particularly strong in the crisis period. Price impact costs, on the other hand, have a negative effect on trading activity until the second half of 2007, but cease to be a significant factor afterwards. We attribute this change to the improvements in algorithmic execution systems in the same period which have a documented diminishing effect on trade sizes with the introduction of the Globex Platform.
with ψ n,m a stacked row vector of ψ j coefficients from the n th to the m th , e t−n,m a stacked column vector of disturbances e j from time t − n to time t − n − m, 0 n×m an n × m matrix of zeros, I n is an n × n identity matrix. The variance parameters are uniquely identified using the covariance matrix of the stacked disturbances 
which comprises the innovation

Fig. 6. Trade Volume Figures and Public Innovation Variance Estimates
The figure shows, from top to bottom, the intraday variation in trade volume and the estimates of the public innovation variance σ 2 t from the model presented in section 2.3 for 20 half-yearly intervals from 2004 to 2013. Both the estimations and the trade volumes use data sampled at 5-minutes frequency.
Fig. 7. Information Asymmetry, Price Impact and Noise Variance Estimates
The figure shows, from top to bottom, the estimates of the information asymmetry coefficient θ t and price impact coefficient δ t and the noise variance ω 2 t from the model presented in section 2.3 for 20 half-yearly intervals from 2004 to 2013. Both the estimations use data sampled at 5-minutes frequency.
Fig. 8. Noise-to-Innovation Ratios During Afterhours Periods
The figure shows the mean noise-to-innovation ratios in four afterhours periods. The ratios are computed by dividing the noise variance ω 2 t to the innovation variance σ 2 t and taking their averages for each afterhours period. The parameters are estimated using the model presented in section 2.3 for 20 half-yearly intervals from 2004 to 2013. 
Fig. 11. The Coefficient Estimates for the Cross-Sectional Regressions
The figure shows the coefficient estimates generated by regressing the changes in trade volume on the estimates of public innovation variance, unexpected order flow coefficient and price impact coefficients for each 5-minute interval during the afterhours. Results significant at 5% level are emboldened. As the regressors are estimates themselves, we use the Murphy and Topel (1985) method to calculate correct standard errors.
